There is a judicial movement to create a special working group to speculate on a possible renegotiation of the agreement.   The Trump administration continued its transactional approach to alliances during cost-sharing negotiations with Seoul. In 2018, after the expiration of the ADM, the government called for a 150% increase – $1.2 billion per year -, To maintain the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula.5 Seoul has rebuffed those demands by offering an 8.2 percent increase and a shorter expiration date for the ADM, and allies have agreed to renegotiate the agreement each year with gradual increases.6 But when the agreement again expired at the end of 2019. When the agreement expired again at the end of 2019.6 But when the agreement expired again at the end of 2019. , the Trump administration has requested a 500% increase in contributions.7 Negotiations lasted months, 8 unaware that South Korea paid 90 percent of the $11 billion construction of Camp Humphreys, the largest U.S. military base overseas, and is a major U.S. defense client. ”9 The Trump administration has rejected Seoul`s best offer of 13 percent and has not yet defined what a ”fair and equitable” cost-sharing agreement would look like.”10 The Moon administration has tried to cover up some of the Alliance`s divisions because it needs U.S. support for its peace initiative with North Korea. North Korea wants sanctions and security guarantees – concessions seoul cannot make without U.S. support.
Mr. Moon has made the development of inter-Korean relations his main foreign policy initiative, and much of his legacy will depend on his ability to deliver on those promises successfully. This is how Moon tried to downplay differences of opinion and, if possible, to meet Trump, in the hope of keeping the US`s engagement with Pyongyang alive. President Trump and his Korean counterpart Moon Jae- discussed for the first time a Korus renegotiation at the U.S.-Korea summit in June 2017. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Trade Representative, Robert Lighthizer, requested the convening of a special meeting of the KorUS Joint Committee.8 The special session took place in August, but could not find a solution. At the time, however, press reports indicated that Trump was indicating a possible U.S. exit from the agreement.9 After a new meeting in October, however, the two sides agreed to begin the process of amending the agreement.10 The KORUS renegotiation is a useful example of Trump`s trade agreement in practice. As we will see below, the renegotiations have made only minor changes to the agreement and could be adopted in such a way that the reality of Trump`s trade policy does not always correspond to rhetoric. However, the government`s concerns about trade with Korea have always been less acute than their concerns about trade with other trading partners, so the conclusion of the korus talks, with minor changes, can only reflect the government`s focus on other areas of trade policy and not on its overall approach to trade policy.