After the 2008 financial crisis, investors focused on a certain type of repo, known as Repo 105. It has been speculated that these deposits played a role in Lehman Brothers` attempts to conceal its declining financial health that led to the crisis. In the years following the crisis, the repo market declined significantly in the United States and abroad. However, in recent years it has recovered and continued to grow. While conventional deposits are generally instruments that are sifted against credit risk, there are residual credit risks. Although this is essentially a guaranteed transaction, the seller may not buy back the securities sold on the due date. In other words, the pension seller does not fulfill his obligation. Therefore, the buyer can keep the warranty and liquidate the guarantee to recover the borrowed money. However, security may have lost value since the beginning of the operation, as security is subject to market movements. To reduce this risk, deposits are often over-insured and subject to a daily market margin (i.e., if the guarantee ends in value, a margin call may be triggered to ask the borrower to reserve additional securities).
Conversely, if the value of the guarantee increases, there is a credit risk to the borrower, since the lender is not allowed to resell it. If this is considered a risk, the borrower can negotiate a subsecured repot.  Some forms of repo have been highlighted in the financial press because of the technical details of the comparisons that followed the collapse of Refco in 2005. From time to time, a party participating in a repo transaction may not have a specific loan at the end of the repo contract. This can lead to a number of errors from one party to another, as long as different parties have acted for the same underlying instrument. Media attention is focused on attempts to mitigate these errors. The crisis has revealed problems with the pension market in general. Since then, the Fed has intervened to analyze and reduce systemic risks. The Fed has identified at least three problematic areas: the criteria for security eligibility could include the type of investment, the issuer, the currency, the home, the rating, the maturity, the index, the size of the issues, the average daily trading volume, etc. Both the lender (repo-buyer) and the cash borrower (pension seller) close these transactions in order to avoid the administrative burden of bilateral deposits. In addition, because the security is held by an agent, the counterparty risk is reduced. A tripartite pension can be considered the result of ”law rest due.” A billing service payable is a repo in which the guarantee is retained by the cash borrower and not delivered to the cash provider.
There is an element of increased risk in relation to the tripartite pension as collateral on a billing bank payable, which is held on a customer deposit with the Cash Borrower and not in a security account with a neutral third party.